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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                             
 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Dieter Troster, an employee of the State 
Correctional Institution at Greensburg, Pennsylvania (“SCI”), is 
in danger of losing his job as a corrections officer because, as 
a matter of principle, he refuses to wear an American flag patch 
on his uniform as required by departmental regulations.  He filed 
suit in the District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania against the Pennsylvania State Department of 
Corrections, its Commissioner Joseph D. Lehman, and SCI 
Superintendent Fredric A. Rosemeyer, seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.  After holding an 
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Troster's request 
for a preliminary injunction.  The Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections then ordered Troster suspended for five days for 
gross insubordination.  This court granted an emergency motion 
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for an injunction pending appeal, and Troster has remained on the 
job.  Troster has appealed the district court's order denying him 
a preliminary injunction. 
 Troster advances two theories to support his 
allegations that the threatened disciplinary action violates his 
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  First, he 
advances a "compelled speech" argument--that the flag patch 
regulation that he refuses to observe unconstitutionally compels 
him to engage in expressive or symbolic conduct.  Second, he 
presses a "symbolic protest" theory, under which he urges that 
his refusal to comply with the department regulation should be 
protected as expressive or symbolic conduct intended and likely 
to communicate his opposition to being compelled to "speak" by 
wearing the flag patch. 
 In Part 8 of this opinion we hold that Troster did not 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his 
compelled expression claim.  Even recognizing that in the wake of 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2344 (1995), the threshold test of 
expressiveness necessary to raise a First Amendment compelled 
expression claim is no longer as stringent as we previously 
suggested in Steirer by Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 
F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1993), see infra at 9-11 & n.11, we believe 
that on the record before it the district court properly 
concluded that the Department's flag patch regulation did not 
require correctional officers such as Troster to engage in any 
conduct sufficiently imbued with elements of communication that 
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the regulation might be forbidden by the First Amendment's 
proscription against compelled speech. 
 With respect to the alternative symbolic protest 
theory, we conclude in Part 17 that, under the particular facts 
of this case, Troster has not stated an analytically independent 
claim of constitutional violation.  One who violates a 
governmental compulsion to speak or engage in expressive conduct 
merely to express opposition to that compulsion on "compelled 
expression" grounds engages in no independently constitutionally 
protected conduct.  In such a case the appropriate rubric for a 
First Amendment claim is simply "compelled expression," and that 
is therefore the sole free speech theory that we consider.  As 
noted, it fails on the present record.  Accordingly, the order of 
the district court denying Troster's motion for a preliminary 
injunction must be affirmed. 
1.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Dieter Troster is a naturalized American who emigrated 
to the United States from Germany when he was in his early 
twenties. He enlisted in the U.S. army, went to Officers' 
Candidate School, became an officer, and was eventually promoted 
to the rank of Major.  In 1981 he retired after twenty years of 
service, including time in Viet Nam.  Two years later Troster 
secured employment with SCI.  He has since received promotions 
taking him from Corrections Officer Trainee to Corrections 
Officer 2 with the rank of Sergeant. His duties include 
supervising inmates acting as janitors and directing other 
corrections officers in their assigned tasks. Troster is also a 
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Training Sergeant, and he thus serves as an example to lower 
ranking corrections officers. 
 In 1991, the American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees, the bargaining representative for the 
corrections officers, requested the Department to allow officers 
to wear an American flag patch on their uniforms.  The Department 
adopted a regulation allowing officers up through the rank of 
Sergeant to wear an American flag patch on the right shoulder 
sleeve of their uniform shirts.  The patch authorized by the 
Department displays the flag with the star field oriented toward 
the officer's back (with the star field in its customary position 
in the upper left corner of the flag).  Although the original 
regulation was permissive, on February 15, 1993 the Department 
promulgated new uniform regulations (effective March 15) that 
mandated display of the flag patch on the right sleeve of the 
uniform shirt, star field oriented toward the rear. 
 The Department adopts regulations concerning uniforms, 
including the flag patch regulation, with the intent of 
projecting the image of a professional correctional force.  The 
district court found that such an image is important to the 
overall operations and security of SCI.  The presence of the 
American flag patch is now one of the identifying features of a 
corrections officers's uniform, which indicates, the district 
court found, that the wearer is authorized to exercise the lawful 
powers of corrections officers, including the use of firearms.  
The district court accepted Superintendent Rosemeyer's contention 
that the Department's interest in displaying the American flag as 
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part of the uniform is legitimate because it fosters loyalty and 
obedience to superior officers. 
 Almost immediately upon adoption of the mandatory flag 
patch regulation, Troster objected to being compelled to display 
the American flag.  He believes that state-compelled display 
desecrates the flag and debases it.  Troster considers the 
required displays deeply objectionable not only because of his 
conviction that the American flag symbolizes freedom from state-
coerced political or patriotic speech, but also because, in his 
view, displaying the flag with its star field to the rear 
signifies cowardice and retreat from the principles for which the 
flag stands.  Troster further believes that the "New Flag Code" 
Resolution adopted by Congress in 1976, 36 U.S.C. §§ 173-177, 
does not authorize corrections officers to wear the flag as part 
of their uniform (although he does not press this argument on 
appeal). 
 In May 1993, in response to Troster's objections, the 
Department decided not to enforce the flag patch regulation 
pending review by the Department's General Counsel.  Thus, the 
regulation remained optional or unenforced from the spring of 
1991 to January 27, 1994, with few if any disciplinary problems 
resulting. Operations ran smoothly at SCI during this time. 
 Nevertheless, despite the fact that Troster's 
performance as a corrections officer had otherwise been 
completely satisfactory, on January 20, 1994 the Superintendent 
of SCI notified Troster that the Department would begin enforcing 
the flag patch requirement on January 27, and that he must comply 
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or face disciplinary proceedings.  Troster continued to refuse to 
wear the flag, and on January 26 he filed this 28 U.S.C. § 1983 
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the 
mandatory aspect of the Department's flag patch regulation.  The 
next day the Department ordered Troster to appear at a fact 
finding meeting. 
 There, Troster was advised that his continuing refusal 
to comply with the regulation constituted gross insubordination 
and violated specific paragraphs of the Correctional Officer's 
Code of Ethics.  A disciplinary hearing was set for February 8.  
In the interim, however, a short-term agreement between Troster's 
and the Department's counsel allowed Troster to continue working 
without wearing the patch.  Except for that temporary 
dispensation for Troster, the Department has enforced the 
regulation uniformly since the end of January 1994. 
 On February 1, 1994, Troster moved for a preliminary 
injunction against the Department's attempts to discipline him 
and against the mandatory aspect of the flag patch regulation on 
which those proceedings were based.  On February 3, the district 
court held a hearing on this motion, at which time the 
Corrections Department agreed to stay disciplinary proceedings 
against Troster until the court ruled on the injunction. 
 By order dated March 18 the district court denied 
Troster's motion.  The court concluded that Troster had failed to 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because neither 
the flag patch regulation nor Troster's refusal to wear the patch 
was sufficiently expressive to be protectable under First 
8 
Amendment free speech rights.  Five days later, Troster moved for 
reconsideration or injunction pending appeal.  Two days after 
this motion the Corrections Department held a pre-disciplinary 
conference; four days later the district court denied Troster's 
request for reconsideration.  On April 4 Troster filed a notice 
of appeal.  The next day, he moved in this court by motion for an 
emergency injunction pending appeal.  Defendants notified Troster 
that if he continued to refuse to wear the flag patch, he would 
be suspended for five days commencing April 9.  On April 8, a 
motions panel of this court granted Troster's motion for an 
injunction pending appeal.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b). We review the grant or denial of a preliminary 
injunction for abuse of discretion; the district court's 
discretion is abused if it erred in stating or applying the law.  
See Frumer v. Cheltenham Tp., 709 F.2d 874, 876 (3d Cir. 1983). 
2.  THE COMPELLED EXPRESSION CLAIM 
a. 
 Troster objects to the compulsory aspect of the 
Department's flag patch regulation on the grounds that it compels 
him to engage in expressive conduct in violation of the First 
Amendment.  "[T]he protection granted by the First Amendment is 
not limited to verbal utterances but extends as well to 
expressive conduct."  Steirer by Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. 
Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 994 (3d Cir. 1993).  Moreover, "[t]he 
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment, though not 
absolute, includes both the right to speak freely and the right 
to refrain from speaking at all."  Id. at 993 (quoting Wooley v. 
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Maynard, 430 U.S. at 714, 97 S. Ct. at 1435) (internal quotation 
marks and footnote omitted). 
 We are not dealing here with compelled disclosure of 
personal or private information.  See, e.g., Leora Harpaz, 
Justice Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy:  The Supreme Court 
Struggles to Protect Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REV. 
817, 818 (1986) (distinguishing "[t]wo distinct kinds of liberty 
interest [that] support the right to refrain from expressive 
activity[,] . . . . an interest in not being forced to reveal 
information about personal beliefs or associations . . . . [and] 
an interest in not being forced to belong to any organization or 
to make any statements when [individuals] would rather be silent 
or express different views") [hereinafter Harpaz, Intellectual 
Individualism]; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 484-90, 81 
S. Ct. 247, 250-53 (1960) (public school teacher need not reveal 
all organizations to which teacher has belonged).  Instead, the 
issue is whether the flag patch requirement "invades the sphere 
of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official 
control," West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 642, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 1187 (1943). 
 The threshold issue with respect to Troster's compelled 
expression claim is whether the flag patch regulation required 
Troster to engage in expressive conduct.  In Steirer by Steirer 
v. Bethlehem Area School District, 987 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1993), 
this court held that, in order for governmentally compelled 
conduct to be considered "expressive" within the meaning of the 
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First Amendment, the actor must have "[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message . . . and in the surrounding circumstances 
the likelihood [must be] great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.'"  Id. at 995 (quoting with 
alteration Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11, 94 S. Ct. 
2727, 2730 (1974) (per curiam) (emphases supplied here).  When 
determining whether conduct is expressive for First Amendment 
purposes, many other courts and commentators have also 
interpreted Spence to require both an intent to convey a 
particularized message and a great likelihood that this message 
will be understood. 
 Whether or not this reading of Spence was justified,0 
the Supreme Court just this past term has made clear that "a 
narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of 
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions 
conveying a `particularized message,' cf. Spence v. Washington, 
418 U.S. 405, 411, 94 S. Ct. 2727, 2730 (1974) (per curiam), 
would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson 
                                                           
0Spence, which has become the touchstone for evaluating whether 
conduct is expressive for First Amendment purposes, contained no 
language of necessity.  A particularized intent and a likelihood 
that the message would be understood were present in that case, 
but the Supreme Court did not say that those were always required 
for expressive conduct.  Rather, after discussing the context in 
which Spence's protest occurred, the next paragraph of the 
Court's opinion "noted, further, that [Spence's conduct] was not 
an act of mindless nihilism."  Id. at 410, 94 S. Ct. at 2730.  In 
concluding the paragraph elaborating this observation, the Court 
simply explained that in Spence's case, "[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message was present, and in the surrounding 
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it."  Id. at 410-11, 94 S. Ct. at 
2730. 
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Pollock, music of Arnold Schönberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis 
Carroll."  Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2345 (1995) (citation omitted). 
 In light of Hurley, we believe that Steirer's 
restrictive test is no longer viable, and that the expressiveness 
of conduct should be gauged by the language that Spence 
explicitly articulated as a test:  whether, considering "the 
nature of [the] activity, combined with the factual context and 
environment in which it was undertaken," we are led to the 
conclusion that the "activity was sufficiently imbued with 
elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments . . . ."  Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-10, 
94 S. Ct. at 2730.  This test for determining whether the flag 
patch requirement compels "expression" from Troster and the other 
corrections officers is a fact-sensitive, context dependent 
inquiry.  And, Troster's contentions to the contrary 
notwithstanding, we apply this test not only to symbolic protest 
cases (see discussion infra) but also to cases alleging compelled 
expressive conduct.  The burden of proof concerning this question 
is on Troster, and, as we now explain, he has not at this point 
met his burden under Spence. 
b. 
 We note at the outset of our analysis that this case is 
unlike most of the Supreme Court's compelled expression cases in 
that it does not involve actual verbal or written expression.  In 
Barnette, the plaintiff schoolchildren were required to salute 
the American flag and to recite the pledge of allegiance.  319 
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U.S. at 628-29, 63 S. Ct. at 1180-81.  In Wooley v. Maynard, the 
plaintiffs were required to display the written ideological 
slogan "Live Free or Die" (New Hampshire's state motto) on their 
license plates. Even in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 
U.S. 209, 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977), "a state-required contribution 
by public school teachers to a labor union's activities was 
deemed expressive conduct, but only to the extent those union 
activities involved the expression of political views, the 
support of political candidates or the advancement of other 
ideological causes."  Steirer, 987 F.2d at 995 (citing Abood, 431 
U.S. at 234-36, 97 S. Ct. at 1799-1800). 
 In contrast to Wooley, Barnette, and Abood, the 
compulsion to which Troster objects does not involve words, which 
convey a clear ideological message.0  Even if other drivers or 
pedestrians did not think that the Maynards (as opposed to the 
state) were the source of the message "Live Free or Die," the 
message was being delivered to such bystanders.  Here, in 
contrast, flag patch observers are presented with a symbol that 
has various and somewhat imprecise ideas associated with it.  
Completely aside from the question of misattribution, see, e.g., 
Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2349 (reserving the question of "the 
                                                           
0Although other Supreme Court cases involved First Amendment 
challenges to required statements that were not ideological, see, 
e.g., Riley v. National Federation for the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 
795-801, 108 S. Ct. 2667, 2676-80 (1988) (invalidating law 
requiring professional fundraisers to disclose to donors 
percentage of contributions turned over to charities), these are 
more properly viewed as "compelled disclosure" cases, rather than 
"intellectual individualism" cases like Barnette, Wooley, and 
Abood.  See Harpaz, Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REV. at 
818-19. 
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precise significance of the likelihood of misattribution"), the 
record does not sustain the conclusion that the flag patch on the 
correctional officers' uniforms will relay any message 
(ideological or otherwise) to anyone; Troster has presented no 
evidence that it is likely to function in a communicative 
fashion. 
 The conduct required of Troster bears a slightly 
greater resemblance to that demanded of the plaintiff in Lipp v. 
Morris, 579 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1978), where a high school student 
successfully challenged the requirement that she "show full 
respect to the flag while the pledge is being given merely by 
standing at attention" during the flag salute and recitation of 
the Pledge of Allegiance.  Id. at 835 n.2 (emphases supplied).  
We also recognize some similarity among the governmental purposes 
in Barnette, Lipp, and here:  in Barnette the state required 
students to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance 
in order to promote national unity, see 319 U.S. at 631 n.12, 63 
S. Ct. at 1182 n.12; in Lipp the state required the plaintiff to 
stand in order to demonstrate respect for the flag; and here the 
state required Troster to wear the flag in part to foster loyalty 
and obedience to his superior officers.  Additionally, we may 
agree with Troster that the flag of the United States is an 
"obviously expressive element," Br. of Appellant at 26-27 
(quoting Steirer, 987 F.2d at 995), and we are fully cognizant 
that the flag is a unique symbol in our history, one "[p]regnant 
with expressive content."  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405, 
109 S. Ct. 2533, 2540 (1989). 
14 
 Nevertheless, we think that the gap between Troster's 
case and Lipp is not one that we may bridge on the present 
record. As the Supreme Court has admonished, not every action 
taken with respect to the flag is expressive.  Id.  Under the 
circumstances in Lipp, the conduct required of the plaintiff 
plainly could be seen as a demonstrative act of respect for the 
flag shown by her (coerced) actions.  She was required to stand 
silently at attention, displaying respect, while her classmates 
saluted the flag.  The government had thus specifically required 
that she engage in conduct manifesting an attitude.  Here, 
however, it is not apparent from the record that the conduct 
required of Troster--passively wearing the flag patch--is 
similarly demonstrative of an attitude or belief.0  Rather, there 
is presently no basis for concluding that the requirement that 
Troster wear the flag patch on his uniform compels him in effect 
"to profess any statement of belief or to engage in any ceremony 
of assent to one."  Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634, 63 S. Ct. at 
1183.0 
                                                           
0We are aware--and if Troster establishes the communicative 
nature of the flag patch regulation at the final hearing the 
district court should bear in mind--that in Wooley v. Maynard, 
the Supreme Court recognized that "[c]ompelling the affirmative 
act of a flag salute involved a more serious infringement upon 
personal liberties than the passive act of carrying the state 
motto on [one's] license plate, but" it considered "the 
difference [to be] essentially one of degree."  430 U.S. at 715, 
97 S. Ct. at 1435 (quoted in Laurie Allen Gallancy, Teachers and 
the Pledge of Allegiance, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 929, 939 (1990)). 
0From the failure of the opinion in Lipp to mention "record 
evidence that standing during the flag ceremonies conveyed a 
particularized message," Br. of Appellant at 26, and the 
approving citation of Lipp in Steirer, 987 F.2d at 994, Troster 
argues that "the Steirer court could not have enunciated a 
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 Troster was one of an entire force of corrections 
personnel required to wear the flag patch on their uniforms. 
Evidence at the hearing showed that the uniforms of a large 
number of organizations have flag patches on them.  Troster, 
however, presented the district court with no evidence (for 
example, surveys) suggesting that anyone (other than himself) 
would be likely to view the wearing of the patch as communicative 
or expressive, or that people who wear such uniforms with such 
flag patches actually assert anything to anyone.  Observers might 
perhaps infer that the wearer is patriotic, but Troster put on no 
evidence that observers would likely understand the patch or the 
wearer to be telling them anything about the wearers' beliefs.  
Cf. Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom 
of "Speech", 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1525, 1554 & n.122 (citing H.L.A. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
principle that required record evidence to support the 
proposition that the act in question will be understood in a 
particular fashion, as the District Court required in this case," 
Br. of Appellant at 26-27.  The district court, at the time 
properly following Steirer, may have searched for too narrow a 
message in the act of wearing the flag patch.  See discussion 
supra n.10 and accompanying text.  However, neither that fact nor 
the lack of citation to record evidence in the Lipp opinion 
relieves Troster of the burden of showing that the flag patch 
regulation compelled him to engage in expressive conduct.  The 
state-coerced conduct at issue in Lipp was a ceremonial 
gesture--"standing at attention"--occurring in the midst of even 
more blatant expressions of respect for the flag, all confined to 
a brief set period each school day.  Here, the conduct at issue 
is the wearing of a small patch on a uniform sleeve throughout 
the entire work day.  We do not agree with Troster that it is 
"readily inferable," Br. of Appellant at 27, that wearing a flag 
patch on a corrections officer's uniform "would be seen by most, 
if not all, observers as showing respect for the flag," id., and 
we do not think it too great a burden on Troster's First 
Amendment interests to require him to come forth with some 
evidence to support his otherwise bare assertion that the flag 
patch regulation compels expressive conduct. 
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Hart, Signs & Words, 2 PHIL. Q. 59, 61-62 (1952), discussing 
whether neighbor shutting windows in preparation for coming storm 
asserts something thereby, and concluding "no") [hereinafter 
Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication]. 
 We do not know whether survey data might be available 
to support Troster's expressive conduct claim.  Perhaps Americans 
(or even an appropriate subset thereof, such as inmates and staff 
of and visitors to SCI) do in fact perceive people who wear (for 
example) a Boy Scout, Girl Scout, or police uniform with a flag 
patch as expressing a patriotic or other ideological message or 
agreement therewith; perhaps not. 
 Our duty, however, is to evaluate Troster's likelihood 
of success on the basis of the evidence presented.  And as we 
discuss below, see infra at 18-21, the Supreme Court has 
cautioned that the First Amendment should not be held to shield a 
limitless variety of conduct from governmental regulation.  Thus, 
sympathetic as we may be to Troster's genuine patriotism as well 
as with his predicament, we cannot accept his suggestion that we 
hold, as a matter of "common sense" and law, that the mere act of 
wearing a uniform with a flag patch on it constitutes an 
expressive or communicative "use" of the flag, cf. Spence, 418 
U.S. at 410, 94 S. Ct. at 2730 (“The Court for decades has 
recognized the communicative connotations of the use of flags.”) 
(emphasis supplied), within the scope of the First Amendment. 
c. 
 In short, Troster has not at this time met his burden. 
The district court's factual conclusion that "[w]earing the flag 
17 
patch on a corrections officer's uniform . . . does not convey 
any agreement or disagreement with all or any of the many things 
a flag may symbolize, or the Department's view of the flag," op. 
at 21, App. at 124, is sufficiently supported by the current 
record. Accordingly, we hold that Troster has not shown a 
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits with respect to 
his compelled expression claim, for he has not made the necessary 
threshold showing that he was (probably) coerced to engage in 
expressive conduct.  Thus, Troster presented the district court 
with no basis to have granted him a preliminary injunction. 
3.  VIABILITY OF THE SYMBOLIC PROTEST THEORY IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES 
a. 
 Troster's alternative theory is that, given the 
circumstances, his refusal to wear the flag patch required by the 
Department constituted symbolic expressive conduct protected by 
the First Amendment.0  This raises the question whether Troster 
can present both the compelled expression and symbolic protest 
claims, that is, whether he has an analytically independent 
symbolic speech claim?  While we do not gainsay that a refusal to 
comply with a governmental directive may in some cases amount to 
symbolic protest covered by the First Amendment, this is not one 
of those cases. 
 Our narrow conclusion does not ignore the Supreme 
Court's historical solicitude for free speech claims, its high 
                                                           
0Technically the First Amendment is inoperative against the 
states, but its strictures are nonetheless binding on the states 
via the Fourteenth Amendment.  For simplicity, however, this 
opinion frequently refers only to the First Amendment. 
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regard for a "preferred right[]," see, e.g., Smith v. People, 361 
U.S. 147, 169, 80 S. Ct. 215, 227 (Douglas, J., concurring), 
reaffirmed in several of the Court's recent decisions.0  But we 
are satisfied that where, as here, a person seeks only to express 
opposition to what he or she perceives as a governmental 
compulsion to engage in speech or expressive conduct, refusing to 
comply with the very governmental compulsion at issue is not 
protected as symbolic protest under the First Amendment, for that 
theory obscures the nature of the interests at stake.  Put 
differently, in circumstances such as these where there is a 
colorable claim that a governmental compulsion violates the First 
Amendment's restrictions on governmentally compelled speech, 
there are not two potentially viable arguments that the 
Constitution's free speech guarantees protect a person's refusal 
to comply with the governmental compulsion solely because of 
opposition to the compulsion.  The compulsion to "speak" may be 
addressed either as a symbolic protest claim, or as a compelled 
speech claim, but not both.  Here, as shall be apparent, the most 
apt rubric is compelled expression. 
 Our conclusion that Troster may not raise both a 
compelled expression claim and a symbolic protest claim grounded 
solely in objection to compelled speech is animated by the 
caution with which the Supreme Court has instructed courts to 
view symbolic conduct claims.  The Court has warned that not all 
                                                           
0In the 1994-1995 term, the Supreme Court ruled on eight free 
speech claims.  "In seven of eight First Amendment-related cases, 
the party asserting free speech rights prevailed."  64 U.S.L.W. 
3055 (Aug. 1, 1995). 
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conduct, even conduct involving the flag of the United States, is 
"expressive" for purposes of the First Amendment.  See Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405, 109 S. Ct. at 2540.  We do not presume 
that Troster's refusal to wear the flag patch on his correctional 
officer's uniform was not expressive as a factual matter.  See 
also infra at 22.  Rather, we believe that as a legal matter, the 
First Amendment does not protect any "right" to disobey a 
governmental compulsion for the sole purpose of expressing 
protest against the compulsion on the grounds that it allegedly 
requires one to engage in speech or expressive conduct. 
 As Professor Tiersma has explained, a recurring 
jurisprudential concern "is that the Free Speech Clause may be 
invoked by anyone who violates a law, claiming to protest against 
it."  Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication, 1993 WIS. L. REV. at 1585. 
For example, Tiersma recounts that in Cox v. Louisiana the 
Supreme Court stated that "[o]ne would not be justified in 
ignoring the familiar red light because this was thought to be a 
means of social protest."  Id. (quoting Cox, 379 U.S. 536, 554, 
85 S. Ct. 453, 464 (1965)).  Similarly, Justice Scalia has 
observed that "virtually every law restricts conduct, and 
virtually any prohibited conduct can be performed for an 
expressive purpose--if only expressive of the fact that the actor 
disagrees with the prohibition."  Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 
501 U.S. 560, 576, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 2466 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (emphasis supplied) (cited in Tiersma, Nonverbal 
Communication, 1993 WIS. L. REV. at 1585-86).  See also, e.g., 
State of Washington v. Adams, 479 P.2d 148 (Wash. App. 1971) 
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(rejecting defendant's contention that his using a set net in 
violation of regulatory salmon fishing statute was "symbolic 
speech" protected by First Amendment where defendant's only 
purpose in using the net was to demonstrate the irrationality of 
the statute prohibiting its use). 
 As the foregoing discussion suggests, permitting 
parties to pursue a claim that the First Amendment grants them a 
right to violate a law solely as a means of publicizing their 
objection to that law would burden courts with essentially 
duplicative First Amendment claims.  We believe that this problem 
is particularly acute where individuals violating a governmental 
compulsion to engage in some behavior merely assert that their 
violation expresses their belief that the compulsion 
unconstitutionally requires them to speak or engage in expressive 
conduct.  In such circumstances, both the compelled speech and 
the putative symbolic protest theories involve the same 
objection:  the individual does not want to be used by government 
as a mouthpiece to disseminate ideological messages.  The 
symbolic protest theory simply adds a desire to communicate this 
opposition to others. 
 The addition of a constitutional symbolic protest claim 
to a compelled speech claim in this circumstance would only serve 
to give individuals an additional yet futile bite at the apple.0 
                                                           
0Limited as our powers of imagination may be, we nevertheless 
cannot conceive of circumstances in which individuals' symbolic 
protest claims grounded solely in refusal to engage in allegedly 
coerced expressive conduct could succeed where the root 
expressive conduct claim failed.  If government had an interest 
sufficient under the First Amendment to justify compelling 
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We do not believe that the Constitution's free speech guarantees 
countenance such a waste of judicial resources (and of the 
governmental resources needed to defend such claims).  It 
distorts the constitutional inquiry to shift the focus away from 
the government's interest in enforcing its expressive-conduct 
compulsion (despite opposition thereto), to focus instead on the 
individual's interest in communicating opposition by violating 
the compulsion, as Troster's dual theory would do.  Rather, we 
believe that, in circumstances such as these, the goal of the 
individual's conduct is properly characterized with regard to the 
First Amendment as avoiding the compulsion, rather than 
expressing disagreement with it. 
 In sum, symbolic protest claims are not analytically 
independent of compelled expressive conduct claims in the 
circumstances that we have described.  Courts must therefore 
determine which theory more accurately captures the essence of 
the constitutional objection.  Cf. Walters v. National Ass'n of 
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 335, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3196-97 
(1985) (holding that free speech claim essentially duplicating 
the objection presented in due process claim was of "no 
independent significance").  In this case, it is the compelled 
expressive conduct claim.  We hold that Troster's conduct was not 
constitutionally protected as a means of symbolically expressing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
individuals to deliver ideological messages despite their 
opposition, it seems that interest would also be sufficient to 
justify requiring the individual to deliver the message despite 
his or her desire to communicate that opposition (to either the 
message or the compulsion) by refusing to deliver it. 
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opposition, on compelled expression grounds, to the expressive 
conduct that Troster perceived the flag patch requirement to 
compel. 
b. 
 This holding does not require us to reject the 
reasoning of Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299 (11th 
Cir. 1983), upon which Troster relies and which bears some 
factual similarity to the instant case.  In Leonard, a number of 
police officers were disciplined for appearing in uniform without 
the flag patch required by departmental regulations.  The 
officers had staged a public rally at which they removed their 
patches to protest racial discrimination within the police force.  
The court of appeals held that the officers' conduct amounted to 
symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment.  See id. at 
1304. 
 Troster suggests that this holding at the very least 
strongly counsels for a ruling in his favor.  Leonard, however, 
is unlike this case in a crucial respect, which we believe is 
what the district court was driving at when it distinguished 
Troster's situation from Leonard on the grounds that Troster 
lacked an "underlying political or patriotic message."  Op. at 21 
(JA 000124). 
 In Leonard, although the conduct at issue (the means of 
the officers' protest) was violation of the flag patch 
regulation, the object of the protest was not the regulation 
itself, but rather discrimination by the Department.  The reason 
for the protest was that the Department's alleged racial 
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discrimination violated their rights to equal protection of the 
laws, not a belief by the officers that the regulation compelled 
them to engage in expressive conduct in violation of their First 
Amendment rights.  Thus, the officers were engaged in speech for 
some reason other than protesting being used as a governmental 
mouthpiece. 
 As in Leonard, the means of Troster's protest was also 
violation of a departmental flag patch regulation.  In contrast 
to the officers' protest in Leonard, however, the object of 
Troster's protest was the regulation itself.  The reason for 
Troster's violation was that the regulation allegedly 
unconstitutionally compelled him to "speak" by wearing the patch 
on his uniform. Thus, even if Troster engaged in symbolic speech 
by violating the flag patch regulation, he did so solely for the 
purpose of protesting the fact that (in his view) the regulation 
improperly compelled him to "speak."  Hence, it is apparent that 
the reason for Troster's conduct--namely, his violation of the 
Department's flag patch regulation, which was the basis for the 
disciplinary proceedings that he seeks to enjoin permanently--the 
only point that he was trying to make, was that the regulation 
violated his First Amendment right not to be a mouthpiece for the 
government. Troster's symbolic protest claim is thus wholly 
derivative from his compelled expression claim, which is the 
essence of his objection to the flag patch regulation, and his 
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free speech objection should accordingly be subject only to 
compelled expression analysis.0 
 Similarly, the symbolic protest claim in Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U.S. at 405, 94 S. Ct. at 2727, was not 
derivative of a compelled expression claim.  There, Spence 
displayed an American flag with peace signs attached in order to 
protest American violence in Cambodia and at Kent State.  After 
being arrested for violating a law that prohibited improper 
display of the American flag, his successful claim was that he 
had a First Amendment right to express his message in that 
fashion, and that the state could not constitutionally punish him 
for doing so. Spence's means of expression was a violation of the 
flag display statute, but the reason for his protest, the message 
he sought to convey, was not a belief that the flag display 
statute (a prohibitory measure) compelled him to express 
                                                           
0This derivative relationship would not be present in the case of 
a Rosa Parks sitting in the front of a segregated bus.  If her 
actions were analyzed as expressive conduct, her message would 
not be that the ordinance requiring her to sit at the back of the 
bus was forcing her to say something.  She would not be simply 
protesting being used as a mouthpiece to deliver some 
governmental message.  Her message would be that the Jim Crow 
regime was denying her the equal protection of the laws.  Thus, 
even if she were to raise both an equal protection and a symbolic 
protest claim against the governmental compulsion, her 
message--conveyed by her violation of the seating 
ordinance--would be more than simply opposition to being forced 
by the ordinance to "say" something, and thus she would have only 
one colorable free speech claim, and symbolic protest (rather 
than compelled expression) would be the appropriate mode of 
analysis.  While the seating requirement certainly reflected a 
racist attitude or view about the dignity and social status of 
black Americans, objection merely to compelled "speech" simply 
would not have been the only message Rosa Parks sought to convey 
by her actions. 
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something that he did not want to say.  He was not protesting 
being forced to act as a mouthpiece for government.  Thus, the 
free speech claim in Spence lacks the duplicative quality of 
Troster's claim(s), and that case does not help him establish 
independent viability of his symbolic protest theory.0 
c. 
 Our conclusion that Troster cannot press both theories 
is further supported by the Supreme Court's treatment of the 
First Amendment claims in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 705, 97 
S. Ct. at 1428.  The plaintiffs in that case were two Jehovah's 
Witnesses who objected on political and religious grounds to 
being required to display New Hampshire's state motto--"Live Free 
or Die"--that was imprinted on their license plate.  After being 
prosecuted several times for covering the motto, the Maynards 
challenged the constitutionality of the state law making it a 
crime to obscure the motto, seeking injunctive relief prohibiting 
future prosecutions for their covering the motto (usually with 
                                                           
0Indeed, even a person who burns a flag to protest a statute 
prohibiting flag burning would not have the same derivative 
structure to his or her claim.  Certainly, the means of the 
symbolic protest would be a violation of the very law that is the 
object of the protest.  But the reason for the protest would be a 
belief that the statute unconstitutionally prohibited him or her 
from speaking; while there may be viewpoint discrimination at 
work, there is no colorable compelled speech claim there.  By 
prohibiting flag burning, the statute simply does not require the 
hypothetical banner burner to express anything.  So there is just 
one free speech claim in this scenario:  that government is 
unconstitutionally prohibiting an individual from speaking his or 
her mind.  The flag burner cannot claim that the prohibition 
forces her to act as a mouthpiece for government, and there is 
thus no difficulty in letting the individual proceed with a 
symbolic protest claim. 
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red reflective tape). The Maynards argued both that their act of 
covering the motto was constitutionally protected because it was 
necessary for them to avoid a compelled affirmation of belief, 
and that their act constituted protected symbolic speech not 
outweighed by sufficient state interests.  A three-judge district 
court declined to "consider whether their First Amendment right 
to be free from a required affirmation of belief is implicated," 
concluding instead that the Maynards' affirmative act of covering 
the motto was constitutionally protected expressive conduct.  406 
F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (1976). 
 On appeal, the Supreme Court took a dramatically 
different approach to the case.  The Court "found it unnecessary 
to pass on the `symbolic speech' issue," concluding that there 
were "more appropriate First Amendment grounds" on which to 
affirm the judgement of the district court.  430 U.S. at 713, 97 
S. Ct. at 1434.  The Court explained: 
We turn instead to what in our view is the essence of 
[the Maynards'] objection to the requirement that they 
display the motto `Live Free or Die' on their 
automobile license plates. . . .  We are thus faced 
with the question of whether the State may 
constitutionally require an individual to participate 
in the dissemination of an ideological message by 
displaying it on his private property in a manner and 
for the express purpose that it be observed and read by 
the public.  We hold that the State may not do so. 
Id., 97 S. Ct. at 1434-35 (emphasis supplied). 
 While the Court did not expressly rule that the 
Maynards had no viable symbolic protest claim, its opinion cast 
grave doubt on the prospects of that argument.  As then-Justice 
Rehnquist interpreted the majority opinion, "the Court[] 
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implicit[ly] recogni[zed] that there is no protected `symbolic 
speech' in this case . . . ."  Id. at 720, 97 S. Ct. at 1438 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Of particular note is the 
majority's assertion that had the state granted the Maynards' 
request for special license plates not containing the state 
motto, the act of displaying them would not be "sufficiently 
communicative to sustain a claim of symbolic expression."  Id. at 
713 n.10, 97 S. Ct. at 1434 n.10. This observation alone could be 
virtually dispositive of Troster's symbolic protest claim. 
 The Court stated in Wooley that the display of a 
license plate without the state motto would not amount to 
constitutionally protected expressive conduct, see id. at 713 
n.10, 97 S. Ct. at 1434 n.10, even though most other cars 
displayed plates with the motto, and even though "New Hampshire 
citizens [were] generally aware that individuals like the 
plaintiffs ha[d] been covering the `Live Free or Die' on their 
license plates in order to express their opposition to the 
motto's implication that political freedom is the greatest good," 
see 406 F. Supp. at 1387 n.11.  Similarly, since Troster opposes 
the flag patch regulation because he believes that it coerces him 
to engage in "speech" (actually, expressive conduct), we believe 
that his conduct in wearing his correctional officer's uniform 
without the flag patch, which is required and is in fact worn by 
all the other guards, would not be protected symbolic speech even 
if, as he argued before the district court, his contemporaneous 
and repeated explanations would insure that observers would 
likely understand the reason for his refusal. 
28 
 In reaching this conclusion, we note that the Supreme 
Court in Wooley did not contest the evidence and the district 
court's conclusion, see id., that the people of New Hampshire 
would most likely understand the significance of the Maynards' 
acts. Rather, the Court concluded that the act of displaying 
"expurgated plates" would not "sustain a claim of symbolic 
expression."  430 U.S. at 713 n.10, 97 S. Ct. at 1434 n.10 
(emphasis supplied).  The fair implication of this is that 
certain conduct might be expressive in fact yet not protected by 
the First Amendment as symbolic expression. 
 In determining that Troster's conduct falls into this 
category, we emphasize that the Supreme Court focused on what it 
termed "the essence" of the Wooley's constitutional claim against 
the anti-defacement statute.  The basis of the Maynards' claim 
was, constitutionally speaking, not that the law in question 
prohibited them from "communicat[ing] affirmative opposition to 
the motto." Id.  Rather, the essence of their constitutional 
objection was that the State was requiring individuals to help 
disseminate an ideological message by displaying it on their 
private property. See id., 97 S. Ct. at 1434-35.  This is not a 
symbolic protest issue, but a compelled expression issue, which 
is how the Court treated it. 
 Coming full circle, we believe that, as a matter of 
law, the essence of Troster's objection to the flag patch 
regulation is not that it limits his ability to protest being 
used as a governmental mouthpiece.  Rather, the essence of his 
claim is reflected by the stated reason for his protest:  Troster 
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believes that the regulation in question unconstitutionally 
requires him to engage in expressive conduct in violation of his 
First Amendment rights.  This is a colorable compelled expression 
claim, and that is how we have analyzed his constitutional 
challenge to the Department's regulation in Part III supra. 
 In sum, because the message Troster wishes to 
communicate is simply opposition to the Department's flag patch 
regulation on compelled expression grounds, and because his 
preferred method of communicating this message is violation of 
the regulation, compelled speech analysis is the proper vehicle 
for his constitutional challenge.  Since we have rejected that 
claim, the order of the district court denying Troster's motion 
for a preliminary injunction will be affirmed. 
 The injunction we granted Troster pending this appeal 
will be vacated. Parties to bear their own costs. 
